

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-08 /100 W
-----112018 161341Z /42

P R 161280Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1946
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USUN
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST
USCINCEUR
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 3734

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEIR, TU, US, CY

SUBJ: EFFECT ON TURKISH CYPRUS POLICY OF FAILURE TO LIFT EMBARGO

1. SUMMARY: AS TURKS HAVE INDICATED, CONGRESSIONAL DEFEAT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO WOULD CAUSE THE
ECEVIT GOVERNMENT TO REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY,
INCLUDING ITS CYPRUS POLICY. ALTHOUGH THAT REVIEW MIGHT NOT
RESULT IN A DRAMATIC, IMMEDIATE CHANGE, IT WOULD, WE BELIEVE,
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RESULT IN A HARDENING OF THE GOT ATTITUDE WHICH IN TURN WOULD
GREATLY DIMINISH THE CHANCES OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF INTER-
COMMUNAL TALKS AND COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A COMPLETE
BREAKDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS FOLLOWED BY PARTITION OR
UDI. END SUMMARY.

2. ONE OF THE MANY QUESTIONS BROUGHT INTO FOCUS BY THE

CLOSE VOTE IN THE HIRC MAY 4 AND THE SFRC DEFEAT MAY 11
IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO TURKEY'S CYPRUS POLICY IF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO FAILS. SUCCESSIVE
TURKISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY OBJECTED TO THE CONCEPT OF
LINKAGE BETWEEN THE EMBARGO AND THE DEVELOPMENTS ON CYPRUS, BUT
UNDER DEMIREL THE GOT MAINTAINED "REVERSE" LINKAGE BY SAYING THAT
IT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS AS LONG
AS THE EMBARGO REMAINED IN FORCE. WHEN ECEVIT CAME TO
POWER IN JANUARY, HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO REMOVE THIS
REVERSE LINKAGE, DECLARING THAT TURKEY'S NATIONAL INTERESTS
DICTATED A CYPRUS SOLUTION REGARDLESS OF THE EMBARGO.

3. ALTHOUGH ECEVIT HAS RECONFIRMED THE POLICY OF NON-LINKAGE
SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST WEEKS, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY
APPARENT THAT LINKAGE WILL IN FACT CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE
GREEK SIDE SEES ONLY TWO FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVES: (A) TURKISH
CAPITULATION ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES; OR (B) CONTINUATION OF THE
EMBARGO WHICH, IF NOT TOTALLY SATISFACTORY, AT LEAST KEEPS
TURKEY IN CHECK WHILE GREECE INCREASES ITS AIR AND NAVAL
BUILDUP. SINCE TURKISH CAPITULATION IS UNLIKELY, THE GREEK
AND GREEK CYPRIOT POLICY OF CHOICE IS CONTINUATION
OF THE
EMBARGO. THIS CHOICE SEEMS PREMISED ON THE BELIEF THAT
THE TURKS WILL ULTIMATELY RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESSURE

OF THE EMBARGO--A BELIEF WE CONSIDER UNREALISTIC AND
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4. ECEVIT HAS ALREADY BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT HIS UNILATERAL "PEACE OFFENSIVE" DID NOT INDUCE MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE OTHER SIDE. IF THE EMBARGO IS RECONFIRMED BY CONGRESS--AN ACT TURKS WILL SEE SIMPLY AS A RESPONSE TO GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT PRESSURES--WE EXPECT ECEVIT WILL RESPOND BY "REVIEWING" THE WHOLE RANGE OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICIES INCLUDING ITS CYPRUS POLICY. SUCH A REVIEW WILL TAKE PLACE IN A DOMESTIC POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE CHARGED WITH EMOTIONAL NATIONALISM, AND ITS RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO REFLECT THAT ATMOSPHERE. REASONED CONSIDERATION OF POLICY OPTIONS WILL PROBABLY TAKE A BACK SEAT TO EFFORTS TO FIND A SCAPEGOAT AND
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ASSERT NATIONAL DIGNITY. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE AN OPEN REJECTION OF THE VIEWS AND CONCERNS OF OUTSIDERS, PARTICULARLY THE US.

5. NEVERTHELESS, OF TURKEY'S SEVERAL APPARENT POLICY OPTIONS, ONLY ONE--CAPITULATION--IS LIKELY TO BE DISCARDED OUT OF HAND. THE OTHERS--FROM STANDING FAST TO UDI--SEEM TO US TO BE A CONTINUUM OF SUB-OPTIONS FOR WHAT WILL PROBABLY EMERGE AS THE NEW TURKISH APPROACH. WE CANNOT TOTALLY RULE OUT IMMEDIATE AND ANGRY GESTURES (SUCH AS SETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA) BUT WE EXPECT ECEVIT'S INITIAL APPROACH WILL TAKE SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING FORM:

A. A STATEMENT THAT HIS EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN PREDICTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WISHED TO NEGOTIATE A FAIR SETTLEMENT, AN ASSUMPTION WHICH THEY HAD DESTROYED;

B. A REAFFIRMATION OF A WILLINGNESS OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PROPOSALS NOW ON THE TABLE; AND

C. A WARNING THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY HOSTAGE TO AN ILLUSORY GREEK CYPRIOT GOODWILL.

6. ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN APPROACH ARE NOT YET CLEAR. ONE THAT IS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WILL BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL OSTENSIBLY REMAIN WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. BUT, IN FACT, DISILLUSIONED BY THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF THE GREEK SIDE--AND OF THE WORLD IN GENERAL--TO THEIR EARLIER EFFORTS, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BECOME INCREASINGLY RIGID. IN SUCH A SITUATION, RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
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WILL BECOME DEPENDENT ON A MAJOR CONCILIATORY EFFORT BY THE GREEK SIDE, WHICH WE GATHER WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY UNLIKELY DEVELOPMENT.

7. WITH NO PROSPECT OF RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, IT IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL TURKEY RESPONDS TO THE PRESSURES OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND SUPER-NATIONALISTS IN TURKEY TO SEEK A "NEW INTERNATIONAL STATUS" FOR THE TURKISH FEDERATED STATE OF CYPRUS. THIS IS A STEP THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ONLY WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES BOTH LONG-STANDING RPP POLICY AND POPULAR CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. WE THEREFORE THINK IT IS UNLIKELY THT THE GOT WILL SOON AGREE TO A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. BUT "CREEPING PARTITION"--THAT IS, STABILIZATION OF THE CURRENT DIVISION--WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO EITHER INDEPENDENCE OR INCORPORATION INTO TURKEY.

8. THIS ANALYSIS IS SPECULATIVE AND WE CANNTO BE SURE HOW CLOSELY ITS PROJECTIONS WILL COINCIDE WITH DEVELOPMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE TURKISH REACTION TO A DEFEAT OF THE EFFORT TO REPEAL 620X WILL, AT THE VERY LEAST, MEAN A SERIOUS SETBACK TO EFFORTS TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE. AT WORST, IT COULD MEAN UDI AND/OR PARTITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.
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